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By James L. Huffman*

The Allocative Impacts of Mineral
Severance: Implications for the
Regulation of Surface Mining
I. INTRODUCTION

Surface mining involves the removal of overlying layers of dirt and
rock as the technological means of reaching the valuable minerals
which are the miner's object. It is a technology of enormous machinery. A single shovel in the modern coal mine will dwarf the ordinary
home. Where precision is the hallmark of the subsurface miner whose
economic success and life depend upon the care with which he works
his way through the earth's concealed mineral deposits, brute force
and destruction mark the work of the surface miner. The result is the
generation of normally massive amounts of waste material and the
near total destruction of the surface.
Since the earliest use of surface mining techniques, there has been
need to define the relative rights of surface and subsurface owners
where the two estates are severed. More recently there has also been
a concern for the third party impacts of surface mining.' A spate of
state and federal legislation designed to alter these third party effects
has coincided with the rapid expansion of strip mining, particularly in
the western United States.2 This article examines the allocative con*Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Institute, Lewis and Clark Law
School B.S., Montana State University; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University; J.D., University of Chicago. The author is indebted to Ms. Debbie Hartman for
bibliographic and citation assistance with the final version. The author is also grateful to
George Priest and Edward Brunet for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. The most common third party impacts are likely to be air and water pollution, subsidence, and aesthetic pollution. The less common, but more catastrophic, may involve flooding such as occurred at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia in February of 1972. See New York
Times, July 6, 1974, at 7, col 2 for a report on the $13.5 million dollar settlement of an action brought by survivors of the 125 people killed in the disaster. For a description of the
more common third party consequences of surface mining see Binder, A Novel Approach to
Reasonable Regulation of Strip Mining, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 340 (1973) and Mintz,
Strip Mining: A Policy Evaluation, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 462 (1976).
2. Federal regulation is pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1979). For a summarization of this legislation see W.
RODGERS, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 518-527 (1979). State legislation adopted prior to 1977 is surveyed in SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY TO NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE SURFACE MINING LAWS: A SURVEY, A COMPARISON
WITH THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION, AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, presented to the 95th Cong., 1st Sess. in 1977. See also W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 381 n. 44 (1977) for a collection of commentary on state legislation. Articles
published since 1977 include Newton and Sherman, Evolution of Control of Surface Mining
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sequences of mineral severance and of regulatory controls designed
to minimize the impacts of surface mining on third parties. 3
The principal objectives of this article are three. First, in relation
to the definition of subsurface and surface rights in the use of the
surface, it will be demonstrated that the principles which underlie
the common law of mineral severance are sound from the perspective
of allocational efficiency. Whether the surface owner is faced with a
severed mineral estate owner who seeks to use the surface for exploratory purposes or who seeks to totally destroy the surface by strip
mining, both the land and mineral resources will be most efficiently
developed through a system of private rights very much like that
which has developed in the American law of mining. To the extent
that inefficiencies do result from the existing law, improved efficiencies is more likely to result from refinement of the private rights system than from regulation by government.
Second, it will be shown that concerns over the third party impacts
of surface mining must be addressed within the context of this system of private rights in a severed mineral estate. Most valuable minerals in the United States are owned separately from the land which
overlies them. 4 The imposition of regulations on any type of mining
will have consequences in terms of both the mineral and surface estates. It is true that many mineral lands, particularly in the west, are
owned, either in the surface or subsurface, by government. Although
the analysis of the allocational problem is clearly different under a
mixed regime of public and private ownership, an analysis not pursued in this article, the importance of relating regulations adopted in
the interest of third parties to the fact of severance is unchanged.
Finally, the article will propose a theoretical framework for the
analysis of alternative approaches to regulating the mining of severed
of Coal and Uranium in Texas, 29 BAYLOR L REV. 847 (1977); McGinley, Prohibitionof
Surface Mining in West Virginia, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 445 (1976); Proposalfor Increased Administrative Discretion in The Formulation of Iowa's Surface Mining Reclamation Requirements, 62 IOWA L. REV. 522 (1976); and Rochow, The FarSide of Paradox:State Regulation of the EnvironmentalEffects of Coal Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 559 (1979).
3. Widespread third party impacts are frequently referred to as social costs. The analysis
in this article relies upon the conception of social cost articulated by Professor Coase in The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
4. Although many severed estates are the consequence of private transactions, federal
land laws in the West have made a significant contribution. For a discussion of various reservations under United States patents see Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D. L. REV.
369-74 (1974). For discussions of the impacts of severed mineral interests on federal lands
see: Dempsey, Forest Service Regulations Concerning the Effect of Mining Operations on
Surface Resources, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 481 (1975); Dempsey, Mineral Prospecting
in Urban Areas: A Study of Surface and Mineral Rights Conflicts Under the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 860 (1974); Dempsey, Surface Damages from Strip Mining Under the Stock Raising Homestead Act, 50 DENVER L. J. 369 (1973).
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mineral interests. It will be shown that mandatory reclamation and
the prohibition of surface mining are approaches certain to lead to
allocational inefficiency in some cases and likely to do so in most
cases. It will also be shown that intermediate regulatory approaches
require sophisticated empirical information which will normally be
more efficiently generated privately than by government. For that
reason it will be preferable to seek cost internalization through assignments of private rights rather than through regulation. Regulation
should proceed with the recognition that cost and benefit data generated outside the market place has a high probability of error. Attempts to improve upon the human condition through surface mining
regulation may turn out to be detrimental.'
II. SEVERED MINERAL ESTATES

Under the common law of England fee simple title to a parcel of
land included ownership from the center of the earth to an altitude
6
above the land which is necessary for the enjoyment of the land.
Thus, most minerals in the United States were originally owned by
whoever had title to the overlying surface lands. However, there was
considerable precedent in both the common law and the civil law for
the severance of mineral interests from a land estate, 7 and Americans
were quick to resort to the existing law of mineral severance for the
many economic advantages it allowed to both surface and subsurface
resource developers. By conveying mineral interests to the parties, surface owners could generate capital for use in the development of the
surface lands. At the same time, mineral developers could pursue
their occupation without the need to invest capital in lands which
were not necessary to the development of the minerals. Both the surface and mineral owners could take advantage of the economies of
5. The risk of inefficiency from regulation in the face of poor information on costs and
benefits is increased by the realities of a political process which allows for wealth redistribution in the name of improved allocational efficiency. Such redistributions of wealth will be
likely to reflect the distribution of political influence rather than any articulated theory of
wealth distribution.
6. The maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad caelum et ad inferos-he who owns the
land owns everything above it and everything beneath it-is the traditional statement of the
common law doctrine. 1 H. STEPHEN, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
85 (21st ed. 1950).
7. In England, gold and silver were reserved to the king. In Derbyshire, lead and tin
mines could be separately acquired by discovery. For a discussion of the early English law of
mining, see I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 284-5
(Reprint of the 1st ed., 1979); 1 C. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL LANDS § 3 (3rd ed., 1914); 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF MINING § 1.1, at 3-4 (1974).
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specialization which developing technologies made increasingly significant.
Of course, the owner of a mineral interest could not develop the
minerals without some use of the overlying surface lands, a fact so
obvious that few instruments of severance ever bothered to detail the
nature of the mineral owners right to use the surface. It was no doubt
assumed by both parties that the mineral owner would use the surface to the extent reasonably necessary for the development of the
minerals. Few surface owners would have been sufficiently naive to
believe that they could sell rights to minerals underlying their lands
without including rights to the use of the surface for the development of those minerals. Although the parties to the various types of
conveyances which resulted in the severance of mineral interests were
most certainly in agreement on this general principle, they were not
necessarily in agreement on the specifics of the mineral owners'
rights. As time passed and both estates were conveyed to other
owners, and perhaps further severed in one way or another, the probable agreement on the general principle that the mineral owner had a
right to use the surface would come to be questioned, both by parties who honestly disagreed on the significance of the relevant evidence of party intentions, and by parties who sought to take advantage of new-found values in the surface and mineral estates.
The principle which the courts employed to resolve the resultant
disputes between surface and subsurface owners has come to be called
the dominant estate rule. That rule provides, consistent with the
assumption that the parties to the original severance intended for the
minerals to be developed, that the owner or lessee of the mineral estate "has a fundamentally superior position, which entitled him to
the free and uninhibited use of the surface estate to such an extent as
is reasonably necessary to explore for and develop mineral production."' Of course the rule is more easily stated than it is applied in
particular cases, but the general principle which it represents is very
clear. It is assumed that mineral owners will not have invested in
rights which they are unable to exercise.
At the same time it is assumed that surface owners will not have
conveyed rights which will prevent them from developing the values
which exist in the surface rights which they have retained. Pursuant
to this recognition of the probable intentions of surface owners on
severed estates, the courts adopted a right to support rule to function
in conjunction with the dominant estate rule. Simply stated, the sur8. Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND AND WATER L. REV.,
49, 52 (1970).
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face owner's right to subjacent and lateral support required the miner
to provide support for the surface, both from underneath and from
the side. 9 Like the mineral estate owner who expects to be able to
develop the minerals, the surface owner expects to be able to develop
the surface.
Although the dominant estate and right to support rules have provided an adequate basis for the resolution of most disputes between
surface and subsurface owners, the recent upsurge in the use of surface mining techniques has caused many courts to feel that the traditional rules are in need of reassessment and revision. When the surface is used for mineral exploration, or mine-mouth location, or road
access, the impact on the surface owner need not be significant. But
when the mining activity results in the total destruction of the surface, one is forced to ask whether or not the dominant estate rule is
resulting in the enforcement of the intentions of the parties to the
original severance. Obviously, if the right to support rule is applied
the result will be a prohibition on surface mining. The courts are thus
faced with two rules which lead to opposite conclusions about the
relative rights of surface and subsurface owners. If the instrument of
conveyance which severed the mineral estate is recent, it will probably indicate the parties' intentions with respect to surface mining,
particularly if surface mining is the normal mining technique in the
particular locality for the particular mineral in question. However,
older conveyances are likely to present the courts with an apparently
intractable dilemma.
Because many mineral conveyances are old enough to predate the
common use of surface mining techniques, and because the evidence
with respect to party intentions is inevitably sketchy to non-existent,
some courts have tended to turn to considerations of public policy in
the resolution of these disputes. This inevitably involves the court in
assessing third party impacts of surface mining and thus changes the
very nature of the traditional dispute between surface and subsurface
owners of a severed estate. It also changes the very nature of the judicial function in such disputes. No longer is the court the adjudicator
of a private dispute relying on rules designed to lead to the implementation of party intentions. The court becomes a maker and implementor of public policy which may or may not have any relevance
to the issue of the relative rights of the parties to the dispute.
9. ". . . it is only fair that the surface owner receive fair compensation for the destruction of the surface unless he expressly waives that right." McCutcheon, The Common Law
Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface Preservation, 38 MISSOURI L. REV. 234, 255
(1973).
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Although there are certainly third party effects of surface mining,
which though different in some cases are not necessarily more serious
than the third party effects of underground mining, it should not be
concluded that the role of the court should be changed simply because the traditional rules of severance interpretation present difficulties in the context of some surface mining cases. Aside from any
questions about the appropriate role of the courts, it can be demonstrated that the traditional law of mineral severance, and in particular
the dominant estate rule, promotes the efficient allocation of both
surface and mineral resources. Unless we have no interest in the efficiency of our resource utilization, it would be folly to abandon the
dominant estate rule in the face of what are essentially evidentiary
obstacles to its application in surface mining cases involving relatively
old instruments of conveyance. The application of the dominant estate rule to these cases will have important distributional consequences, which is why the parties are disputants, but the evidentiary
problems on the distributional question are equally difficult. Indeed
they are the same evidentiary problems. There is no reason to favor
the distributional interests of surface owners simply because there
may be third party interests which coincide with the interests of the
surface owner.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to demonstrating the
validity of the basic contentions: first, that the dominant estate rule
leads to the efficient allocation of resources as between surface and
subsurface owners while providing the best possible approximation
of the intentions of the parties to a mineral severance. Indeed, it is
efficient because it results in the implementation of party intentions.
Second, that inefficiencies which result from third party impacts of
surface mining will be most effectively eliminated by the refinement
of the existing system of private rights and the very cautious utilization of some of the various regulatory approaches which the states
and the federal government have imposed upon surface mining.
III. EVALUATING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES
In formulating and justifying the law of mineral severance, the
courts have consistently focused on the objective of being fair to the
disputants by deciding the case in accordance with the intentions of
the original parties to the severance. 1" Some courts have also given
10. "The most reasonable rule is that each case must be decided upon the language of
the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances, and the intention of the grantor if it
can be ascertained." Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 I11. 126, 141 N.E. 537,
540 (1923).
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consideration to the public policy implications of their decisions,"
but this has normally taken the form of supplementary justification
for a decision based primarily on the interests of the private disputants. Independent of the judicial justification for its interpretation
of the law of mineral severance we can usefully assess the judicial
performance from the dual perspectives of private and public consequences.
A. Treating the Parties Fairly
The first category of effects can be dealt with quite summarily.
There is a legitimate and important social concern for fairness in interpreting the previously established rights of individuals. The key to
being fair is to come as close as possible to preserving the rights
which the parties intended to have relative to each other at the time
of the original negotiation.' 2 The best legal rule for achieving that
purpose is one which provides optimal certainty.' I If at the time of
severance it is established that the mineral estate shall include everything which lies beneath the surface, and that the mineral owner or
lessee shall have the right to use the surface in any way reasonably
necessary for the development of the mineral resource, limited only
by the requirement to provide support for the surface, there will be
no difficulty in being fair to both parties. Even if neither party knew
at the time of the grant that there were diamonds in massive amounts,
the surface owner would have no reason to complain that the diamonds are not the property of the mineral owner. The surface owner
would have sold the mineral estate at a price which reflected the very
slight chance of diamonds being discovered and the mineral owner
would have purchased it with the same knowledge.' 4 The surface
owner may kick himself for having gambled with the odds heavily in
his favor and lost, and it is easy to understand why he might go to
11. One commentator explains the dominant estate rule and its apparent preference for
the mineral owner in these words: "Perhaps the only explanation for the difference is the
recognition of the existence of a public policy which encouraged the exploration, development and production of energy-producing natural resources which are vital to the health,
safety and defense of our country." Manning, MineralRights Versus Surface Rights, 2 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 329, 333 (1969).
12. The principle of fairness adhered to in this article is similar to Robert Nosick's entitlement based theory of justice. R. NOSICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA 150 (1974).
13. Optimal certainty will exist when the costs of its achievement do not exceed the
benefits of certainty. For example, it will probably be true that under some conditions the
transaction costs of voluntary changes will be less than the costs resulting from the rigid determination and enforcement of original intent.
14. The assertion that both parties had knowledge of the possibility that diamonds
might be discovered does not mean that either of them actually thought about the prospect
of diamonds. However, in the same way that we attribute general intent to the parties, it is
appropriate to attribute a general knowledge to the parties.
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court and see if the judge will say he really owns the diamonds, but
there should be no question that the fair decision is to conclude that
the mineral owner is the rightful owner of the diamonds. If the law
assures that the parties' reasonable expectations are realized, then the
law will have dealt fairly with them.
Of course the world is not all so simple. The parties may have had
conflicting expectations which were not understood because of communication failures or because of a lack of knowledge on the part of
one or both parties. The law might alleviate some of the unfairness
which is inherent in such misunderstandings by requiring detailed
lease provisions to deal with every possible issue of future controversy. That too is impossible, of course, and there would be some
point of diminishing returns beyond which the costs of precision in
deed and lease drafting would exceed the value of insuring that the
parties will be treated fairly."5 But the law can approach a high level
of fairness by being cognizant of what the concept really means.
Fairness does not mean assigning a property right to a party who
has no reasonable expectation that it is his. The surface owner who
conveys the mineral rights for fifty cents an acre has no reason to
complain when oil is discovered.'6 That is, he has no reason to complain unless the lease said minerals and he understood the term not to
include oil. But the law could prevent that misunderstanding, or minimize its frequency, by clearly defining what the term mineral is to
include when the parties fail to specifically define it in the terms of
the lease. To the extent that language and information will always be
imperfect, there will always be unfair results from judicial adjudication of rights. But these unfair results can be minimized through the
careful development of legal rules. At a minimum, the courts can
eliminate the blatantly unreasonable assertions of property rights
based on anticipated personal gain rather than reasonable expectations.
Human nature being what it is, we can expect continuing litigation
in this very sensitive area of adjusting correlative rights, and presumably, the pot will continue to boil until the1 last drop of oil or molecule of gas is produced in paying quantities. 7
15. The lack of knowledge of future events, and the low probability of the occurrence
of some events will make it more efficient for parties to effectively delegate the resolution
of some issues to future arbitrators should the events occur.
16. There is a problem in many oil and coal leasing operations of leases which resemble
an adhesion contract. The appropriate remedy for that problem would ideally prohibit adhesion contracts in the first place and thus preempt claims of good faith on the part of the
lessees.

17. Bailey, Disruption to Peaceful Coexistence of Surface Owner and Mineral Lessee, 2
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 154, 155 (1969).
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That boil could probably be reduced to a simmer if the prospects for
accumulation of unearned property rights are reduced by a system of
legal rules which promotes the realization of reasonable expectations.
This goal of fairness, which has so preoccupied the courts for many
years, is in no way in conflict with the goal of maximized efficiency
in resource allocation. Rather the two goals fit beautifully together.
Efficient resource allocation results from satisfaction of individual
desires as determined by the individual. Fairness results from the realization of the intended results of a transaction between two parties.
Thus the attempt to be fair is an attempt to assure that the efficient
resource allocation decision made between two parties is fully realized.' 8
B. Resource Allocation
From the point of view of economists, resources are efficiently
allocated when the total value of production of commodities and services in the society, as measured by prices reflecting individuals' willingness to pay, is maximized. 9 This maximization principle is unconcerned with how the optimal production will be distributed
among consumers. It is claimed to be optimal only in the sense that
no greater yield of goods and services can be achieved by any alternative allocation of resources. This does not mean that those who advocate efficiency analysis are unconcerned with wealth distribution,
nor does it mean that they endorse the distributional consequences of
an efficient allocation of resources.2" Indeed, any efficient allocation
of resources is efficient only in the context of a particular distribution of wealth. Because value is measured by willingness to pay, the
economist must take the existing distribution of wealth as a given in
assessing the efficiency of resource allocation at a particular point in
time.
18. Some will argue for a different or an additional standard of fairness which relates to
income distribution. Equal distribution of the total social wealth may be a social policy
which some would choose to pursue. However, the underlying assumption which justifies
the policy is that every individual can reasonably expect to reap the same benefits and bear
the same costs regardless of individual abilities or motivations. Such a justification is based
on equality of expectations rather than equality of opportunity. Of course, the issue is complicated in fact by the reality of some individuals being disadvantaged in opportunities as a
result of circumstances rather than personal failing. Benign discrimination to correct past
racial or sexual discriminations is the most obvious example.
19. For discussions of efficiency in the context and lingo of the law see R. STEWART &
J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 99-117 (1978); B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi-xiv (1975).
20. For an interesting debate on this and related issues see Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value;
Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle; and Posner, The Value of Wealth:
A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 191-252 (1980).
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The arguments put forward in this paper are directed at the issue
of resource allocation. Wealth distribution is an important issue,
surely as important as resource allocation, but it is not the subject of
this paper except to the extent that a principle of wealth distribution
may depend upon the concept of desert, a concept implicit in the
preceding arguments with respect to fairness. To the extent that one's
beliefs about wealth distribution are amenable to the case made for
fairness, there is a convenient, if not necessary, connection with the
case for efficient resource allocation. However, whatever one may
prefer in terms of wealth distribution, 2 efficiency of resource allocation within the context of the preferred distribution seems a goal
which any individual would support. Within the value structure of
any individual, more is surely better than less, recognizing, of course,
that what is more for one individual may be less for another.
Many who find themselves unpersuaded by the arguments of those
who view the market place as the most efficient resource allocator,
will better appreciate the forceful logic of the market position if they
view a "micro" resource allocation problem. Assume that you have
$20 to spend in the grocery store. You have a grocery list which
would result in a total bill of $21. Thus you must choose not to buy
something on your shopping list. You decide that you could eliminate a carton of cigarettes or a quart of milk and a dozen eggs. Either
solution would bring the amount of your purchases wtihin the limit
of your resources. Even though you know that smoking is dangerous
to your health, you decide to forego the milk and eggs rather than
the cigarettes because you get more pleasure from smoking than from
eating eggs and milk. Have you efficiently allocated your resources?
In a utilitarian sense you have efficiently allocated your resources
because you will maximize your enjoyment by the allocation you
have chosen. 2 There would appear to be only two alternative
methods for allocating your $20 of grocery money. You could close
21. For discussions of alternative principles of distribution see J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE, Ch. 1 (1971); Michelman, On Protectingthe Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARVARD L. REV. 7 (1969); and NOSICK, supra note 12. An economic
concept often discussed in the context of efficiency is Pareto-optimality. ("[A] Pareto-optimal allocation of resources exists whenever any reallocation would make at best one person
worse off." STEWART & KRIER, supra note 19, at 102, n. 7.) This concept integrates a distributional value so that a reallocation which will make at least one person better off without, at the same time, making someone worse off, is preferred to the existing allocation. Id.
at pp. 101-103.
22. A response might be that you could get more satisfaction if you had more resources
to spend, but this ignores the fact that at some point all resources become scarce. Every consumer has finite resources and must allocate whatever that amount is in a way which will
maximize his benefits. The fact that some have more resources than others does not change
the allocative process.
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your eyes and randomly take items out of the shopping cart until you
could afford to pay for the items remaining in your cart. This would
clearly be an irrational method, unless the difference in satisfaction
to be derived from the highest and lowest priority items was less than
the cost (agony) of having to decide which item to eliminate. A second alternative would be to ask someone else to decide what items
you should eliminate from your cart.2 3 If you happened to ask a representative of the American Cancer Society to decide for you, you
would probably leave the store without the carton of cigarettes.
Would you have allocated your resources efficiently?
Some allocation decisions are made for you by others. For example you may want to buy soda pop with cyclamates because it is
cheaper or laundry detergent with phosphates, both of which may
not even be available because of legal rules prohibiting their sale. The
restriction on your ability to buy products containing cyclamates and
phosphate is based either on a benevolent notion that you must be
protected from things which may injure you or on a public decision
to eliminate the social costs (externalities)2 4 which will result from
your injuring yourself. The latter is a rationale consistent with a system of individual choice, but the former is not. It would be possible,
as is done in the case of cigarettes, to simply warn individuals that
something may be dangerous and then allow the individual to choose
whether or not he wishes to assume the risks. The banning of a product eliminates the opportunity for the individual to decide for himself.2 In the case of a legal ban, the opportunity for individual choice
is eliminated by whatever authority enacts the laws, perhaps a majority vote, in which case some will have involuntarily lost their freedom
of choice. In the case of your grocery store allocation decision, freedom of choice is eliminated by referring the decision to a third party,
but it is done voluntarily.
It could be persuasively argued that the voluntary decision to allow
23. Asking someone else to decide for you is different from asking someone to help you
decide for yourself. You might seek advice from another, which advice is then added to the
sum of information which allows you to assess the priorities of your various values.
24. These social costs exist because of (1) a prior social decision to attend to such injuries either through public hospitals or health insurance (public or private), or (2) high transaction costs which prevent those who will bear costs resulting from your injury from negotiating with you and paying you not to use the product in question.
25. The effect of banning a product is to greatly increase the price of the product, both
in terms of money and risks of illegal use. For some consumers a product ban will lead to a
reallocation to other products which will now, because of the higher cost of the banned
product, be higher on the consumer's list of priorities. For others it will require that they
forego more lower priority items so that they can afford the banned product. The result will
depend upon the consumer's relative values, including the value placed on being a law
abiding citizen.
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someone else to make a resource allocation choice is itself based on a
balancing of values. Perhaps such a decision is identical to the random
selection method discussed above. 6 If so, the hypothetical example
will best illustrate the attractiveness of market based resource allocation if it is assumed that by law someone else will fill your grocery
cart with items that can be purchased for $20. Few, if any, individuals will argue for such a system of resource allocation. To contend
for such a system would require a very different conception of
humanity. It would require a totally different moral philosophy than
that which underlies this paper.
The market resource allocation process can be further illustrated
with a second hypothetical example. Assume that you are again in the
grocery store, but this time you have plenty of money to buy what
you want. You and another individual get to the milk stand at the
same time and find a single carton of milk. You both want the milk,
and it is late at night, so there is no place else to buy any until the
next morning. Assuming you both have unlimited money, you can
bargain with each other and the person willing to pay the highest
price will get the milk. The situation is one of scarce supply and the
allocation is to the individual who places the higher value on the milk.
Because the individual who values the milk more will derive the most
benefit from it (as evidenced by his willingness to pay the higher price
and thus relinquish his opportunity to gain other resources with the
same funds), the net social benefit is greater than it would be if by
some other allocation system the milk had gone to the other person.
Efficient resource allocation exists when there is no misallocation.
Implicit in the preceeding discussion is the conclusion that a resource
would result in increased satisfaction for those to whom the resource
is newly allocated as well for those to whom the resource was previously allocated. This is a net gain in total benefits to members of
society as a whole. The market assures that such misallocations are
corrected since both parties will be increasing their net benefits in
any voluntary transaction.2 7
To this point the discussion has skirted the problem of transaction
costs. 28 Professor Coase, in concluding that the assignment of liability has no allocative significance, assumes zero transaction costs,2 9
26. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
27. As Professor Coase demonstrates, the holder of a resource must consider the price
which someone else is willing to pay for it as an opportunity cost of possessing the resource.
If that opportunity cost exceeds the value of the resource to its owner, the resources will be
sold. Coase, supra note 3, at 6-8.
28. Transaction costs include the costs of acquiring information, of negotiating and contracting, and of policing the allocative agreement.
29. Coase, supra note 3, at 8.
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which means that the process of people getting together to bargain
for rights to resources is costless. Professor Posner has applied the
Coasian logic to reach a similar conclusion about the allocative impact of the assignment of property rights.3" This assumption of zero
transaction costs allows one to perceive the effects of transaction
costs on resource allocation. It becomes possible to logically assess
market allocation and to make a reasonable judgment about when
the market results in misallocations of resources.
C. The Importance of PropertyRules
Property rules, like those discussed in this article relating to mineral and surface rights, are critical to the functioning of the market
allocation system. "For the fact is," say Krier and Montgomery,
"that the institution of private property and the existence of markets
are intimately related." 3 1 Without a property right of some sort, the
market would not function. An individual will have difficulty demanding any price for something unless he can give the purchaser
some degree of assurance that the sale will include the right to use
the thing purchased and to exclude others from interfering with that
use. Total certainty of a right to use is not necessary, but as that certainty diminishes, the value of the thing must be discounted by the
degree of uncertainty.
For example, assume that A seeks to buy a piece of land to which
both B and C claim title. The land is worth 100 dollars to A and less
than $100 to both B and C, but in the absence of total certainty as to
who has title, A will not be willing to pay either B or C $100 for the
land. Assuming complete information, all three parties will arrive at
the same assessment as to the likelihood that either B or C has title to
the land. If there is a fifty percent chance that B has title and fifty
percent chance that C has title, all three parties should agree to having
A pay $50 to both B and C.3 2
The relation of property rights to the market becomes apparent.
The existence of property rights in some form is essential to the
working of the bargaining process which establishes a price. The certainty of those rights determines how closely the price will represent
the actual value of the resource in question. Uncertainty might result
from factors other than title disputes such as that in the preceeding
30. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Ch. I (1st Ed. 1973).
31. Krier & Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RES. J. 89 (1973). See also Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS AND PROC. 347 (1967).
32. Problems of risk may affect such a decision, but are beyond the immediate scope of
this article.
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hypothetical example. A politically unstable country might have uncertain property rights if, for example, a continuing issue is land
ownership and land reform. People will be hesitant to invest in land
if a revolution is a serious possibility and the result might be a redistribution of land. If a city zoning commission is known to change
zoning patterns frequently, people will be uncertain as to what uses
of their land will be legal and what will not. Again the landowner will
be hesitant to invest in improving that land. In both cases one result
of uncertainty in property rights may be a misallocation of resources.
The land will not be put to its best use because anticipated value of
the developed land, when discounted by the probability that the
right to develop will be altered, is less than the projected costs of development.
Professor Posner identifies three necessary elements of property
rights if the market is to function as an efficient resource allocator:
universality, exclusivity, and transferability.1 3 There must be universality in the sense that all resources should be owned by someone.
The only exceptions are resources which are so plentiful that everybody can consume as much as they want without diminishing the
amount available to anyone else. This is necessary because of the substitutability of resources and because of the importance of opportunity costs in the allocation of individual resources. If there are private
property rights in coal, and oil is publicly owned, the cost of developing the oil may be borne by the taxpayers generally in which case
the government will not know what price to charge for the oil. (Unless the government charges the actual costs of development in which
case the development costs will be borne by the consumer rather than
the taxpayer.) If the government underprices the oil (e.g. charges less
for the oil than the actual costs of development), there will be an increased consumption of coal. In either case there is a misallocation of
resources.
Universality of resource ownership is also important in allowing
the consumer to determine his opportunity costs. If there are private
property rights in oil, and no property rights in water, the oil developer may use more water for secondary recovery purposes than the
value of the oil recovered would justify. If there were property rights
in water and therefore a price for water, the oil developer would
know that the opportunity cost of every unit of water injected into
the ground is the price of that unit of water. Assume the price of a
unit of water is four dollars and the value of oil recovered for each
unit of water injected is three dollars. If the oil developer owns the
33. POSNER, supra note 30, at 11-13.
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water he could make four dollars by selling it to someone else and
only three by injecting it into the oil deposit (assuming the water
cannot be recovered). If there is no price for the water, there is no
way of knowing the opportunity cost of using it for secondary recovery, and in this example there is a resource misallocation.
There must be exclusivity, a factor which can exist in varying degrees. 3 4 Much of what has been said about the general need for certainty in property rights applies to the need for exclusivity in property rights. The hypothetical used in that context is applicable here
if the assumption of uncertainty as to title is changed to an assumption that both B and C have identical, correlative rights. To A the
land is worth $100 as before, and to B and C their combined interests
in the land are worth something less than $100. The rights of B and
C are certain, although they are nonexclusive. A will be willing to pay
a total of $100 and B and C will accept $50 each because they have
identical interests in the land. Thus, the fact of exclusivity makes
title certain.
The degree of exclusivity is also important. In the hypothetical example the rights are non-exclusive, they are shared between two individuals. One can think of lesser degrees of exclusivity. Assume thirty
lot owners in a housing development have identical, correlative rights
to an open space, and assuming the relevant law allows its sale, it will
be necessary to contract with each of the thirty owners if an exclusive
property right is desired. If exclusive use of the land is worth $100 to
Smith and it is worth $3 to each lot owner to have the land as open
space, it will be transferred to Smith unless the transaction costs of
dealing with all thirty people having an interest in the land are greater
than $10. If the transaction costs exceed the difference in value between the two uses, the land will remain as open space and there will
be a misallocation of resources if reallocation can be achieved with
acceptable costs by some alternative form of transaction.
In the preceeding hypothetical example, it was assumed that there
was no law which prohibited sale of the land in question. Thus transferability is the third of Posner's necessary elements for an efficient
system of property rights. Clearly transferability is necessary if the
market is to function. If state law required that the open space remain in that use, the sale would not go through even if transaction
costs were not prohibitive. Again there would be a misallocation of
resources. That is it would be a misallocation unless the costs to all
34. See Huffman & Fleming, Allocative and Energetic Implications of Land Use Planning, 5 ENVT'L L. 477, 490 (1975) for argument that the distinction between common
property and private property is one of degree on a scale of increasing exclusivity.
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members of society of Smith's exclusive use of the land exceeded its
value to Smith. Then the non-transferability law would promote allocation efficiency if the cost of organization to those who value the
land as open space exceeds the difference between the land's value to
Smith and the sum of values to those who prefer open space. Restraints on transferability may be a method of accounting for externalities, but as a general rule such restraints lead to resource misallocation.
IV. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF LAW OF MINERAL SEVERANCE
Assume that Farmer Jones has ten acres on which he plants corn
and from which he can earn one dollar per acre per year after expenses. Farmer Jones can thus expect a net income of ten dollars per
year from his ten acres. No other use will bring a higher net return.
At an interest rate of ten percent (10%), the discounted present value
of Jones' land over the next twenty-five years for farming is a few
cents less than one hundred dollars. 35
Assume further, that Farmer Jones owns the entire mineral estate
as well as the surface estate. Underlying Jones' ten acres is a deposit
of coal which, after deducting the costs of extraction and transportation to market, is worth two hundred dollars. The coal can only be
strip mined, a process which will result in the total destruction of the
surface leaving the land useless for any other purposes.
Farmer Jones is approached by Sam Slick, a landman for the Consolidated Monster Mining Company. Slick offers Farmer Jones five
dollars per acre for title to all coal on and under the ten acres which
Jones owns. Slick points out to Jones that he will give him a check
for fifty dollars today, which is forty dollars more than Jones can
earn from his land during the entire next year. Does Jones accept the
offer of landman Slick? Of course not. Jones, being an intelligent and
informed landowner, knows that the present value of his land for
farming is one hundred dollars. If he sells to Slick on Slick's terms, he
will only get fifty dollars and will end up with ten acres of buried
topsoil and upturned overburden.
Jones, however, will not allow Sam Slick to go away mad, nor will
Slick choose to go away mad. Both Jones and Slick know that the
present value of the land for raising corn is one hundred dollars and
its present value for mining coal is two hundred dollars. If Jones sells
35. The present value of $10 per year at 10% for 25 years is $99.55. As the period for
which present value is computed increases beyond 25 years, the total changes relatively little.
For example, the discounted (at 10%) present value of Jone's 10 acres for farming over the
next fifty years would be $108.43, an increase of only $8.88 over the second 25 years.
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the ten acres for anything more than one hundred dollars, he will be
better off than he would be if he farmed the land for the next twentyfive years. If Slick agrees to pay anything less than two hundred dollars for the ten acres, Consolidated Monster Mining will be able to
realize a profit on the investment. Being reasonable people, Jones and
Slick agree to transfer title from Jones to Consolidated for a price of
one-hundred and fifty dollars. Jones, who very much likes being a
farmer, will take his $150 and use it to buy fifteen acres of farmland
of comparable quality to that which he has just sold to Consolidated
Mining. Consolidated will strip mine the coal and realize a profit of
fifty dollars which it will invest in the purchase of more coal lands. 6
Ignoring for the present the offended aesthetic senses of the Sierra
Club and the polluted water of downstream holders of water rights,
everyone seems to be better off as a result of the sale of the land by
Jones to Consolidated Mining. But what about the ten acres of spoil
which Consolidated owns? It is worth nothing in its present condition. Consolidated asks Sam Slick to figure out if there is anything
they can do with the ten acres. Slick checks into the costs of reclaiming land and discovers that for eight dollars per acre, the land can be
returned to its original condition. The answer is simple. Consolidated
will reclaim the land and Slick will then go back to Farmer Jones and
they will agree to an exchange for some price between Consolidated's
cost of eighty dollars for reclamation and the reclaimed land's value
to Jones of one hundred dollars. Jones will buy the reclaimed land
back from Consolidated for ninety dollars. Once again Jones has ten
acres with a present value of $100 for farming.
Where have these transactions left our two land users? Jones took
in $150 on the initial sale, he payed out $90 on the repurchase, and
he has farm land worth $100. His net gain is $60. Consolidated Mining payed out $150 to purchase the land, mined coal worth $200, reclaimed the land at a cost of $80 and sold it for $90. Consolidated's
position is a net gain of $60. The combined present value of the ten
acres of land including the coal totals $220 which is more than the
value of the land singly for farming or for mining. Assuming no transaction costs and total information, it is clear that the use of the land
has been maximized. But if we assume that there was not total information, and that, as in the real world, there are transaction costs,
how will the optimum use of the land be affected?
When Farmer Jones was selling his land to Consolidated Monster
36. Consolidated may choose to use the fifty dollars to send Sam Slick to Washington,
D.C. to lobby against a proposed stripmined land reclamation bill. Expenditures for this purpose would be unwise if the demand for coal proves to be inelastic.
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Mining Company, one might well have asked why Jones was selling
the surface as well as the mineral estate. Obviously the surface would
be worthless after it was mined, so it appeared that there was no
reason to retain title to the surface. But had Jones known the land
could be reclaimed for a cost less than its value as farm land, he would
have chosen to sever the mineral estate and sell it to Consolidated.
This would have had two benefits to Jones: First, he would have
avoided the expense of the second transaction with landman Slick
and, second, given the nature of the reclamation process, he probably
could have saved on the cost of reclaiming the land since the top soil
could have been preserved and reclamation could have been done
while the mining was progressing. Jones might well have contracted
with Consolidated to reclaim the land, a task which they will likely
be more able to perform, or he might have sold the mineral estate
conditional on Consolidated's restoration of the surface.
The accounting would look something like this. First assume that
each transaction costs five dollars. Under the first hypothetical case
which included two transactions, the total benefits derived from the
use of the land would be diminished by ten dollars to $210. By requiring only one transaction in the second hypothetical case, the
total benefits will be increased by five dollars. Assume further that by
reclaiming concurrently with mining, the cost of reclamation is reduced to five dollars per acre. Thus, the total cost of reclamation
would be fifty dollars. If Jones sells the mineral estate for $150 and
contracts with Consolidated to reclaim the surface for $50, he will
realize a net benefit of $200. (A net of $100 in his dealings with
Consolidated plus the land's value for farming of $100.)" 7 Consolidated will spend $150 to acquire the mineral estate, will sell the coal
for a net gain of $200, exclusive of the purchase price, and will thus
realize a total net benefit of $50. The total benefit derived from the
use of the land will be $250, assuming no transaction costs, or $245 if
transaction costs are as assumed above. 3 8 Even without the assumed
savings in reclamation costs, the severance of the mineral estate from
the surface estate will have resulted in an increase in total net benefits due to the elimination of one transaction.
37. In fact, assuming that mining and reclamation can be achieved in one year, Jones
will have foregone $10 of present income. However, this cost is ignored in an effort to simplify the illustration.
38. The result will be the same if Jones sells the mineral estate conditioned upon the
reclamation of the surface. Assume Jones gets $100 for the mineral estate. After reclamation,
the land will be worth $100 for farming and Jones will have a net benefit of $200. Consolidated will pay $100 for the mineral estate, $50 for reclamation, and will realize a gain of
$50 upon sale of the coal for $200. The total benefit to both parties is again $250 less transaction costs. (It has been assumed throughout that after extraction of the coal, the mineral
estate has a zero value.)
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The preceding hypothetical case demonstrates that mineral severance does make a difference in the total benefits derived from a single
piece of land. When there is a specialization of functions, farming and
mining in the hypothetical case, it will often be advantageous to
sever the mineral and surface estates in a way which will eliminate
the need for future transactions.3 9 That severance makes a difference
is so because transactions costs can be minimized; both parties will
benefit.4"
It can also be demonstrated that, under an assumption of zero
transaction costs, the assignment of rights of surface use will make no
difference in terms of the ultimate location of the mineral and surface
resources. 4 As in the preceding example, assume that a piece of land
is worth $100 for farming and $200 for mining. What effect will the
assignment of rights to surface use have in terms of how the land is
actually used?
Assume that the mineral owner has a right to use the surface for
whatever purposes reasonably necessary to the exploitation of the
mineral estate. In other words, assume that the traditional dominant
mineral estate principle applies. 4 2 If the mineral development will require use of the entire surface to the exclusion of any farming, it is
clear that the farmer will not be able to afford to buy the surface
rights from the miner. The miner would require in excess of $200 if
he is to forego development of the minerals. The farmer would not
pay more than $100 which is the value of the land for farming.4 3
39. Severance will be advantageous only when both the mining cost advantage enjoyed
by the miner and the farming cost advantage enjoyed by the farmer are more than the cost
of the original severance transaction. In the hypothetical case above, if Farmer Jones could
mine the coal himself at a net gain of $196 and Consolidated Mining could do it at a net
profit of $200, total utility would be diminished by a severance transaction costing five dollars. Similarly, if the miner's reclamation cost advantage is less than the cost of that portion
of the transaction attributable to assigning the reclamation to the miner, total benefits will
be maximized by leaving the reclamation duty with the farmer.
40. The hypothetical cases discussed above and below depend upon an assumption that
the rights of the parties to a severance are clearly stated and not in dispute. To the extent
that such rights are not mutually understood, there may be transaction costs in the form of
litigation expenses. There may be occasions when bearing the cost of litigation is preferred.
There may be circumstances under which a party will believe the present costs, i.e., intransigence on the part of the other party resulting from misinformation, and the resultant costs
of delay, will exceed the costs of settling that right through subsequent litigation. This circumstance should only arise when one or both parties have incomplete or incorrect information.
41. See generally Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. L.
& ECON. 11 (1964).
42. See Brimmer, supra note 8.
43. The hypothetical case probably leaves many with a sense that injustice will have befallen the poor farmer. However, an injustice will have occurred only if the application of
the dominant mineral estate rule is contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties to
the original mineral severance. If the original assignment of rights to the surface was either
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Shifting the rights so that the farmer has exclusive use of the surface will not change the ultimate resource allocation. The miner will
be willing to pay up to $200 for the right to use the surface, and the
farmer will give up his right to the surface for anything in excess of
$100. The miner will pay the farmer some value between $100 and
$200 and the land will be used for mining as before. 4 4
Alternatively, assume that value of the land for farming is $200
and the value of the minerals is $100. If the farmer has exclusive surface rights, he will not be willing to sell them to the miner for less
than $200 and the miner will not be willing to pay more than $100,
so the land will be used for farming. If the miner has rights of surface
use, he will be willing to sell them for anything over $100 and the
farmer will be willing to pay up to $200 for those rights, so again the
land will be used for farming.
In two of the preceding cases, the farmer and the miner found it
necessary to exchange a property right. This exchange, or transaction,
will involve costs. Those costs would have been avoided had the rights
been assigned differently in the first place. This clearly illustrates the
accuracy of Professor Posner's argument that the property rights
should be assigned to the party which would purchase them if they
in conformance with the dominant estate rule or uncertain, there will be no injustice.
If the dominant estate rule is understood by the farmer to be applicable, and if it is the
applicable rule of law, it must be assumed that he understands it. He will have discounted
the present value of continued access to the land for farming by the likelihood that the mineral owner will choose to exercise his right to total surface destruction. In other words, if at
the time of purchase or severance the farmer believes there is a 50% chance the land will be
strip-mined in ten years, he will discount the present value of the use of the land ten years
from purchase by a factor of 50%. If the present value of land for farming over the next 25
years is $100, but there is a 50% chance of not being able to farm the land during the last 15
years, the present value would be diminished by about $17 or half the present value of the
land for farming for the fifteen year period beginning ten years from now.
If the assignment of rights is uncertain, both parties will have discounted the value of
their respective estates by the probability that the right will be determined to belong to the
other party. Obviously, such predictions of future adjudication of rights are difficult, which
is a principal reason the law should seek to provide certainty, but the difficulty of the prediction makes it no less a central part of market decision-making. The point, in either case,
is that the farmer will have made his value assessments on the basis of his legal rights, however well or ill defined. There is no injustice in losing that which one knew did not or might
not belong to him, so long as the loss comes about in conformance with the rules of the
legal game.
44. It will appear from the preceding hypotheses that the assignment of rights will affect
wealth distribution. However, assuming the two cases deal with the same piece of land under
the same market conditions, the value of each estate will be more or less, depending upon
the extent of the surface rights possessed. An assignment of exclusive surface rights to the
surface estate would lead to an increased value of the surface and a decreased value of the
subsurface. The prices paid for the two estates would have reflected the effect of the applicable legal rule. Hence, the second hypothetical case would in fact involve a piece of land on
which the value of the surface in relation to the value of the subsurface is less than in the
first case.
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had been assigned, in the first place, to the other party. 4" A transaction is thus avoided along with its associated costs. Of course, the
assignment of property rights in accordance with this principle requires good information about future property values. Although such
information is necessarily uncertain, the dominant mineral estate rule
has been just such a transaction minimizing assignment of rights.4 6
It should be remembered that the preceding hypothetical cases are
based upon an assumption that if the land is mined it will be without
value for farming or any other surface use. Of course, there may be
many intermediate alternatives between all mining and all farming.
The value of the minerals may vary from one part of the land to another, just as the value of the surface for farming may vary. An agreement may be reached by which some of the land area is used for mining and some for farming. For simplicity of discussion, the examples
have been limited to either/or alternatives. The analysis, however,
would be no different in a more complex case. To the extent that the
uses are compatible, the total value of the land will be $300 or less. It
will be worth $300 only if the two uses are absolutely compatible, a
most unlikely circumstance under available technologies. If the value
of combined use of the land is less than $200, it should, and, assuming
complete information and zero transaction costs, will be used only
for mining. If the value of the land in a combination of uses exceeds
$200, it should be utilized in a way which will maximize the benefits
from the combined uses.
The legal problem, in the simple, two-party model, is to develop a
system of rights assignment which will minimize the costs associated
with achieving the optimum resource allocation. Optimum resource
allocation will occur when transaction costs are minimized so that
such costs will as infrequently as possible hinder the allocation of a
resource to its best use. In a model having no externalities (external
diseconomies) 4 7 this optimum resource allocation will be best
achieved by the application of Professor Posner's rules for property
and liability rights assignment.4 8
To all of this the market place antagonist will say, "It may be true
enough, given all of the assumptions, but it has nothing to do with
the real world. There are transactions costs, incomplete and incorrect
information, and externalities in the real world." As demonstrated
above,4 9 the zero transaction costs assumption does facilitate an
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

POSNER, supra note 30, at 18.
See discussionsupra note 39.
See STEWART& KRIER, supra note 19, at 113-119.
See POSNER, supra note 30.
See Coase, supra note 3.
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understanding of the effects of transaction costs when they are reintroduced into the model. Information, it is true, will never be entirely
complete and correct, but certainly the information available to the
governmental resource allocator is no more complete in a technical
sense, and is of an entirely different type in a qualitative sense,5 o than
information available to private parties. One of the principle advantages of the market allocation system is its capacity for stimulating
relevant information generation. 5 Like transactions costs and information inadequacy, externalities also exist in fact, and it is to that
problem which the discussion will now turn.
V. EXTERNALITIES AND SURFACE RIGHTS ASSIGNMENT
The term externalities has been variously defined, 2 to describe
costs and benefits to people not party to market transactions from
which the costs and benefits result. Alternatively stated, the parties
to a market transaction will only take into account the costs and
benefits which they will experience from the transaction. For example, a coal miner may bargain with an electric utility company for
the sale of some coal. The miner's price will reflect the opportunities
foregone by investing in the costs of coal-i.e. cost of purchase or
lease of the mineral estate, cost of extraction including labor and
equipment, and whatever transport costs are incurred in marketing
the coal. The utility company will be willing to pay only up to an
amount which when added to the other costs of generating and distributing electricity will allow the utility to sell electricity at a competitive price. There are other costs, however, which the parties to the
transaction will not account for. Although those costs seldom result
directly from the actual market transaction, they are costs which if
paid by either of the parties would alter their relative bargaining positions and hence the allocation of the resource. Among these costs are
the water, air and aesthetic pollution resulting from the mining of
the coal and the various pollutants resulting from the generation of
50. The governmental resource allocator theoretically has access to the same technical
information as the private person. In fact, the government may have more resources available for the generation and collection of information, but the government's difficulty is in
knowing what information to collect and generate. What is here referred to as "technical information" relates to supply of resources. What the government allocator lacks is comparable information about demand. Demand information is collected through an entirely different mechanism than demand information collected in the market place. For a discussion of
this information problem in the context of land use planning see Huffman & Fleming, supra
note 34, at 500-507.
51. One of the functions which the market performs in a free market assignment of
rights (through bargaining) is to provide incentives for information production.
52. See STEWART & KRIER, supra note 19, at 113-116.
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the power. Normally, these costs will be borne by those who suffer
the pollution. I3
Two issues are generally raised with respect to these external costs.
Often it is suggested that it is unfair that people should have to bear
the costs of pollution or other external effects of market transactions.
Although this is frequently an automatic response in all pollution situations, it ought not be. Whether it is unfair for pollution costs to be
borne by one party as opposed to another depends entirely upon
who has what rights. If the polluter has a right to deposit wastes in
the atmosphere or in the streams, those affected by the pollution
have no legal complaint, their remedy is to purchase the right from
the polluter and then keep the air or water clean by choosing not to
exercise the right. If, on the other hand, those suffering the effects of
pollution have a right to clean air and water, they will presumably
have a legal remedy should that right be violated, and may sell the
right to potential polluters if the price is right. The law of nuisance is
an example of how such a right to be free from the external effects
of the actions of others is legally exercised." 4 The difficulty, of
course, is that in the vast majority of cases the rights are ill- or undefined, or so it seems to those suffering the effects of pollution. However, to the extent that the courts and legislatures have not granted
relief from pollution, it would appear that the right to pollute has
been legally recognized.5 5 The question of whose rights are being
violated, then, is strictly a legal question which can be answered with
more or less certainty depending upon the situation in question.
The second general issue relating to externalities is whether or not
they represent a market failure, and therefore provide justification
53. Although externalities are generally discussed in terms of costs, there are also frequent external benefits. For example, when someone builds a motel next door to an existing
restaurant, the restaurant is likely to benefit from patronage by motel guests. The restaurant
owner pays nothing for this benefit. Many such external benefits result from planning and
zoning activities by government. These so-called windfalls have been the subject of intensive
study by Professor Donald Hagman as a source of revenue for compensation of those
"wiped-out" by planning and zoning. D. HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND
VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978).
Implicit in Hagman's analysis is the assumption that all such external benefits are unearned. That assumption is open to challenge whenever the action which resulted in the
"windfall" might have been foreseen.
54. See POSNER, supra note 30, at 24-27.
55. Many legislative grants of relief from pollution in the form of maximum pollution
standards may amount to a legislative alteration or taking of property rights if prior to the
legislation the law had recognized an unlimited right to pollute. Of course, such legislative
action is based on the state's police power which, by judicial interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment taking clause, means that a right to pollute never existed in the first place, the
polluter's rights always having been subject to police power limitations. See Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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for government intervention in the market place. If we assume that
the relevant rights are defined, and that the coal miner and the electric utility have a legal right to discharge wastes into the air and
streams, will it be possible for those who are affected by the pollutants to pay the polluter not to pollute? 6 Theoretically, those affected by the pollution may simply total the costs they experience
(each must determine how much he is willing to pay not to be affected
by the pollution), and if that sum is sufficient the polluter will be
willing to sell the right to them. 7 The result will be an optimum resource allocation because whoever derives the most benefit from the
air, whether for its cleanliness or as a place for waste disposal, will be
putting the air to that use.
There are two reasons why the above scenario will not work out in
many cases. First, there are costs associated with aggregating the amounts those affected by pollution are willing to pay. Those affected
will be many in number and each will probably place a relatively low
value on the possibility of being free of that pollution. 8 Hence, the
transactions costs involved in the aggregation of the individual values
will generally be high and may prevent the purchase of the right to
pollute even when the aggregate value of being free of pollution exceeds the value to the polluter of being able to pollute.
In illustration, consider the following example. Assume that an
electric utility company burns coal and pollutes the air as a result.
Assume further that the company has a legal right to use the air in
this manner. In order to prevent the pollution, the company would
have to install equipment costing $900, a cost which they will not
choose to bear since it will result in no benefits to the company.5 9
In the vicinity of the power plant live 1000 people, each of whom
is willing to pay one dollar if they will not have to be affected by the
air pollution. If there were no transaction costs associated with aggregating these 1000 dollars, it is clear that the right to pollute would be
sold by the electric company for some price between $900 and
56. The alternatives are not limited to total or zero pollution. There is a vast intermediate range of possible pollution levels, one of which may be optimum. See W. BAXTER,
PEOPLE OR PENGUINS (1974).
57. Coase, supra note 3, at 8. Coase uses a noise pollution case, Sturges v. Bridgeman
(1879), to illustrate the same point.
58. The individual's valuation of being free from pollution is determined by what the individual would be willing to forego in order to be free from pollution. The opportunity cost
of being free from pollution is what one could purchase for what is being spent to prevent
pollution.
59. There may be some public relations value to the electric company in cutting back or
eliminating its pollution. However, the potential public relations benefits and costs of any
action are presumably considered by every company to the extent that information about
such effects is available.
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$1000. At any price over $900, the company will come out ahead,
since the pollution control equipment will cost $900 and any excess
over that amount would be available for other purposes.
However, it will probably cost a considerable amount for someone
to drive around the countryside collecting all of the dollar bills and
then negotiating a price with the electric company. 6 ° Assume that
cost is $120. The $120 in transaction costs will have to be paid from
the total resources of those seeking to eliminate the pollution, which
will reduce the amount available for the purchase of the right to be
free from pollution to $880. The result is that the bargain cannot be
struck. When the transaction costs exceed the difference between the
value of a right to one possessing it and the value of that right to another, the right will remain with the owner even though it is more
highly valued by the other party.
It is this very situation which the market is supposed to avoid. The
market is supposed to result in the allocation of resources to those
parties who place the highest value on them and will therefore derive
the most benefit from their use. Because of transaction costs, this optimum allocation will sometimes not occur, and it is then that the
government might intervene and effect an allocation different from
that dictated by market transactions. Assuming that these relative
values can be known to government, government intervention would
be justified because the optimum allocation will not otherwise be
realized. But it would only be justified when the costs of government
reallocation including relative value determination are less than the
transactions costs which prohibited the market transfer, and less than
the difference between the value of the resource to its owner and its
value in the highest valued alternative use. This qualification of when
the government should intervene in the market is necessary since any
transaction cost, whether private or governmental, is a negative social
benefit and can therefore only be justified if it leads to an increase in
social benefits greater than the cost of the transaction. 6'
A second factor which leads to the existence of externalities and
60. Alternatively, the company might have sent an agent out to visit with each person to
see if the people as a group would be willing to purchase the right to use the air. However,
there will be transaction costs associated with such company action and the prohibitive
effect of those costs will be the same.
61. Every market transaction involves certain costs. These costs are a necessary part of
the business of allocating resources and must be considered as are all other costs. In some
cases, the transactions costs may be eliminated, (see discussion, note 28 supra) and in some
they may be lessened. Government allocation would only seem to be justified when its costs
of allocation are less than the costs of private allocation. This analysis assumes that information available to government and private allocators is identical, and as the discussion in note
50 supra suggests, that is seldom, if ever, the case.
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may justify government intervention in some circumstances is the
free rider problem.6 2 In the above example, there were 1000 people
who were willing to pay one dollar each to be free of pollution. However, some of those people are likely to decide not to contribute their
dollar on the assumption that most of the others will be willing to do
so and that the benefit can be realized without personally paying
anything for it. The result is that the total resources of the clear air
group are reduced unless there is some means of enforcing payment
by all. That enforcement, if possible, will be an added transaction
cost which would further diminish
the resources available for pur63
chasing the right to clean air.
VI. RECLAMATION OF SURFACE MINED LANDS:
COPING WITH EXTERNALITIES
The ideal solution to an externality problem is to internalize the
costs and thereby eliminate the problem. Many regulatory schemes
have as their purpose the internalization of costs. Consider alternative regulatory approaches to a common externality of surface mining water pollution.
Assume that a miner dumps waste into an adjacent river. The waste
is carried downstream and will have negative effects (costs) for other
water users such as fishermen, farmers, and swimmers. A possible regulatory system could require the elimination of all pollutants.6 4 Such
a regulation would internalize every cost resulting from pollution, a
total elimination of externalities. However, from an allocation point
of view, such a regulatory standard of zero pollution would in all
probability be inefficient. 65 Seldom, if ever, would the value realized
(the external cost eliminated) exceed the cost of eliminating all pollution. The marginal cost of pollution control will generally increase
as zero pollution is approached. The marginal value of eliminating
pollution will generally decrease as zero pollution is approached. An
optimum resource allocation will be achieved when the marginal benefit of eliminating pollution equals, but does not exceed, the marginal
62. See STEWART & KRIER, supra note 19, at 107.
63. Enforced payment as a means of eliminating free riders is only possible where access
to the benefit can be restricted to those who pay, as in the case, for example, of toll highways.
64. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 125l(a)(1) (1972) which states the objective of the federal
water pollution control legislation to be "that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985."
65. Charles Meyers argues that the solution to problems of external diseconomies seldom if ever lies in the setting of standards. Such standards, says Meyers, will always be too
high or too low unless accidentally right. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental
Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticism, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 448 (1975).
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cost of eliminating pollution.6 6 Hence, the regulatory scheme which
prohibits pollution will frequently result in costs to the polluter in
excess of the value of the externalities which the regulation was designed to internalize. This will in turn result in a diminution of total
social benefits and a less than optimal use of the water resource.
An alternative regulatory system for affecting the external costs of
water pollution could be a permit system under which polluters
would pay a fee proportioned on the amount of pollutant discharged.
Theoretically, the allocational effects of such a system will be efficient. The amount of the fee can be apportioned to the external costs
resulting from differing levels of pollution. As marginal pollution
diminishes, the amount of the fee should diminish because of the
lower value of the corresponding marginal external costs. As the polluter's discharges approach the optimal level of pollution, the fee for
polluting should decrease to the level of zero when optimal pollution
is achieved. It is important that the pollution fee not be apportioned
on the basis of volume of pollution alone. Such a system would have
the same defect as the prohibition on pollution in that it would impose, when pollution was less than optimal, costs in excess of the
value of the externalities. The proceeds from such a fee system would
be used either to clean up the pollution and thus limit external costs,
or as direct payments to those who suffer the external diseconomies. 67
Theoretically, the system is an efficient one which could lead to an
66. For an excellent discussion of the case for optimal pollution, see BAXTER, supra
note 56. Baxter argues that pollution permit fees ought to be paid into the general fund and
applied to pollution control. He contends that by not paying them to the injured parties,
there will remain an incentive for those affected by the pollution to improve their situation.
This argument can only be founded on an assumption that no one has title to the air being
polluted, or at least that title is too indefinite. It further assumes that eliminating or decreasing the pollution will be socially optimum. However, this may not be the case. If the fee is
based on external costs of the pollution, it may be that those affected would prefer to suffer
the pollution while expending the rent they receive from the polluter on other values.
The principal reason that this issue arises is that we frequently fail to ask the preliminary
question of who has the legal right to use the air. That must be the preliminary question,
however, or we shall have abandoned the private allocation model and all of the inefficiencies which it brings. Retention by the government of a fee charged for the violation of private rights to clean air is analogous to a taking of private property. Although the short run
consequence may be efficient allocation of the air resource, the long run consequence will
be inefficiency as would result from any other governmental transfer of private property
rights.
67. Consistency with the philosophical theory which underlies the market allocation
system would require that the proceeds of the permit system be paid to those suffering from
the pollution. This is true because the charging of a fee to pollute recognizes that the polluter has no right to pollute, or conversely that the individual affected by the pollution has a
right to clean air or water. The fee, then, is like a rental payment on the right to use the air
as a garbage dump. As with all properties, an efficient system requires that rental payments
be made to the parties having legal title to the rented resources.
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optimal level of pollution, but its operational success is dependent
upon good information about external costs.
A third alternative for pollution regulation would be to have a governmental commission establish permissible levels of pollution. Presumably, the commission's task would be to set allowable pollution
at the optimal level. Successful accomplishment of this task would
require information relating to both the costs of pollution abatement
and the benefits (in the form of eliminated externalities) of pollution
abatement. As indicated previously, 68 the government is not necessarily an efficient accumulator or interpreter of information.
A fourth alternative, of course, is non-regulation which would have
the effect of perpetuating those externalities which result from transaction costs and the free rider problem. External costs would only be
internalized when private transactions lead to that result.
It is assumed in both the preceding and the following analyses that
property rights are clearly defined. For example, in the permit system
of regulation, the requirement that polluters acquire a pollution permit assumes that the polluters do not have a right to pollute-in the
case of water pollution, their rights of use of the water do not include
its use for waste disposal. In order for that use to be legally available,
a polluter must purchase the right to pollute by payment of the fee.
From whom the right to pollute is purchased will be reflected by the
disposition of the fee. If the fee is distributed to those individuals
who have suffered external costs from pollution, the law is recognizing a right in those individuals to have the use of unpolluted water,
and each individual's share of the fee is compensation for the deprivation of that right. If the fee goes into a government fund for cleaning up polluted waters, it may be concluded that the law has recognized a common right in the public generally to have unpolluted
waters.6 9
A regulatory scheme might require that polluters install pollution
control equipment, but provide that the government will finance the
additional operating expenses from general tax revenues. Such a regulatory system would effectively recognize a right in the polluter to
discharge wastes into the water. The public would, by financing the
pollution control equipment, be purchasing the right not to have polluted waters; a right, under the hypothetical regulatory system, dependent upon continued government financing of the pollution control equipment.
68. See note 50supra.
69. As note 66 supra indicates, the shortcoming of this alternative is in the assumption
that those suffering pollution will prefer having it reduced more than whatever might result
from alternative allocation of the fee revenue. The opportunity costs of cleanup may exceed
the benefits.
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Thus, it is important to deal separately with laws which have as
their purpose the definition of property rights and laws which are designed to eliminate or minimize external costs.7" The latter assumes
the existence of certain legal rights and seeks to achieve cost internalization without disturbing those rights. The burdens of any regulatory
system must be borne by those parties whose activities infringe upon
the legal rights of others. Although most regulatory schemes do not
expressly state what the relevant affected rights are, there is always
an implicit assumption that such rights exist. It is possible that such
rights have never been formally defined, in which case the regulatory
laws will effectively operate to define them.
One effect of the existing law of mineral severance is that certain
minerals, primarily coal, must or can be mined in a way which will
partially or totally destroy the value of the surface land. The costs to
the owner of the surface estate are discussed above, 7 1 and are not included in the category of external costs. Among what are properly
labeled as externalities are aesthetic injuries, resultant water pollution, air pollution from dust, noise pollution, and no doubt numerous other effects on third parties. 7 2 One approach to eliminating or
minimizing these external costs is reclamation. The federal government and many states have adopted various forms of surface mined
land reclamation legislation.7 3 It is not within the scope of this article
to catalogue this legislation. Rather, reclamation and other regulatory
approaches will be examined strictly in the theoretical context of the
efficient resource allocation model, with occasional reference to illustrative laws.
As with the example of water pollution, several regulatory alternatives are possible. One possibility is a requirement that all strip mined
land be reclaimed. 7 4 A second alternative is a prohibition on strip
70. Another purpose of regulatory laws might be to effect a redistribution of wealth. It
may be that a right to pollute exists, but the law is simply being used to transfer that right
from one party to another. Such wealth redistribution schemes raise complicated issues
quite distinct from allocational efficiency and therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
71. See Part IV of this article.
72. In formulating policy it is important to remember that not all externalities are costs.
There are some, including this author, who have derived some amount of pleasure from witnessing the technologically awesome processes of modern strip mining. There are external
benefits as well as external costs.
73. See sources cited in note 2, supra.
74. For example, the state of West Virginia may hold miners liable for the actual costs
of reclamation. W. VA. CODE § 20-6-6 (1978). Montana will not issue mining permits except on lands which can be reclaimed. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 50-1042(1) (Smith
Supp. 1975). The rigid view which leads to such non-flexible legislation is evident in an influential article by Denis Binder. "A Good Statute Today Requires Immediate Backfilling
Coupled With Immediate Revegetation." Binder, A Novel Approach to Reasonable Regulation of Strip Mining, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 351 (1973). In the regulation of surface
mining, as in most matters, it is not possible to thus generalize about a "good" statute.
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mining.7" The allocative shortcomings of both approaches are potentially severe. Consider the following hypothetical case.

A particular parcel of land is worth $100 for farming and $200 for
mining. Assume that if the land is mined, it will have no value for

farming unless reclaimed. Also assume zero transaction costs and
complete information. The cost of reclaiming the land if it is mined
is $125. Under a mandatory reclamation law, the land will be mined
at a gain of $200, reclaimed at an expense of $125, and then farmed
at a gain of $100. The net gain will be $175. In the absence of the
mandatory reclamation law, the land would be mined at a gain of
$200 and no further use of the land would be made, at least under

present values and costs, and the net gain would be $200. Thus, with
respect to the two principal parties, the mandatory reclamation law
would lead to a misallocation of resources.

However, the reclamation law was not enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the transaction.7 6 Those interests are protected
by the simple enforcement of property and contract rights.7 7 The
reclamation law is enacted to protect the interests of those who suffer
external diseconomies resulting from the surface mining. To evaluate
the effect of the reclamation law, it is thus necessary to introduce
those costs into the calculation. Assume in the preceding hypothetical
75. For example, the state of Kentucky prohibits strip mining on slopes above a certain
degree. KY. REV. STAT. § 350.028(1) (1978). West Virginia adopted a two year ban on
strip mining in 22 counties. W. VA. CODE § 20-6A-1 (1981). Congressman Hechler of West
Virginia proposed that Congress adopt a similar prohibition. See H. R. 4557, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., Sections 5(a) and 5(b)(2)(B).
76. In fact, legislators have evidenced that concern for the interests of surface owners is
a motivation for the regulation of surface mining. In discussing the legislative history of the
federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 a note in 81 W. VA. L. REV.
553 (1979) observes that: "Controversy surrounding these bills focused upon protecting the
owner of a severed surface estate from the harsh effects of surface mining initiated by the
subsurface owner or tenant." As the discussion above indicates (see note 43 supra), the implementation of regulations for this purpose may be an effective reassignment of rights and
therefore a significant redistribution of wealth.
77. A mandatory reclamation law will not, with one exception, protect the interests of
the surface or mineral owners. In the above example, if the cost of reclamation is less than
$100, the land will be reclaimed. The farmer will be willing to pay some amount less than
$100 to restore the land to its $100 value for farming. If the cost of reclamation is greater
than $100, the land will not be reclaimed, unless and until its value reclaimed exceeds the
cost of reclamation. The parties will reclaim or not reclaim on the basis of resource values
regardless of the law. The exception would arise if land values were such that all surface
owners would purchase reclamation. A mandatory reclamation law would probably eliminate the costs of reclamation purchase to the extent that it was a separate transaction from
the initial conveyance of the coal resource. However, surface owners would probably perceive this efficiency without legal mandate and without the governmental costs of implementing mandatory reclamation legislation. Mandatory reclamation laws may, as in the
hypothetical example in the text, however, have a negative effect on surface and mineral interests as well as a redistributive effect.
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example that the external costs resulting from surface mining the
parcel of land are $50 and that they can be entirely eliminated by
reclamation.7 8 The land will be mined at a gain of $200 and reclaimed
at a cost of $125. However, it is now realized that reclamation has
avoided $50 in external costs which were not accounted for in the
previous example. Had they been accounted for, the net gain without
reclamation would have been $200 from mining, less $50 in external
costs, or $150. Thus, the mandatory reclamation law did result in a
net social gain of $25.
By altering the assumed external cost assumption, the difficulty
with mandatory reclamation is easily demonstrated. If the external
costs of surface mining the parcel is $15 instead of $50, the comparative calculations would look like this:
With Reclamation Law
Mining
+$200
Rec.

-$125

Farming

+$100
$175

Without Reclamation Law
Mining
+$200
External C.

-$ 15

$185

The mandatory reclamation law would result in a less efficient resource allocation than would unregulated mining. The reason is that
the benefits of reclamation (restoring the land for farming and the
elimination of external costs-$100 + $15 = 115) are exceeded by the
cost of reclamation ($125). Whether or not reclamation will be a net
social benefit, then, is entirely dependent upon the cost of reclamation in relation to its resulting benefits (external costs avoided).
It may be argued that mandatory reclamation is nevertheless an
efficient policy because in the vast majority of cases the benefits of
reclamation will exceed the costs. Assuming the factual assertion to
be accurate,7 9 it is still not justification for a mandatory reclamation
law. Providing that the relative costs and benefits are reasonably discernible, the decision to reclaim will be most efficiently made on an
ad hoc basis. As vith any investment, the decision to reclaim surface
mined land must be made in view of the costs and benefits of the
78. Obviously this assumption would seldom be a realistic one. Reclamation will at best
eliminate all external costs only after it is succesfully accomplished. There will generally be
interim aesthetic and pollution costs.
79. It is likely that there is a substantial amount of land for which reclamation costs far
exceed the land's value reclaimed. The volume of the eliminated externalities, of course, is
highly speculative. However, with improving reclamation technology and increasing land
value, the assumption that the benefits exceed the costs of reclamation will probably become more and more accurate as time passes. Under these conditions, of course, the incentives for private reclamation will also grow.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

particular project in question. The only justification for investments
in different resource development projects is when the costs of identifying cost differentials for the various projects plus any added costs
of differential treatment exceed the benefits of differential treatment.
That justification will seldom apply to surface mined land which is
generally in large parcels that are relatively easily distinguished from
each other, and for which the cost/benefit calculus will vary significantly.
A total prohibition on strip mining would have allocative implications similar to those of a mandatory reclamation law. Assume that a
particular parcel of land has a value of $200 for mining and $100 for
farming. The mineral can only be strip mined, and the resultant external costs, in the form of pollution, are $50. Under a law prohibiting all strip mining, the land could not be mined and the net social
benefit from the parcel would be $100 from farming. In the absence
of a prohibition on strip mining, the land could be mined at a gain of
$200 resulting in $50 in external costs or a net social benefit of $150.
Thus, in this case, the prohibition on strip mining would result in a
lower social benefit than no regulation at all. However, the social
benefit would be even greater in the absence of a strip mining prohibition because, under the cost assumption, the land would be reclaimed
after mining and would have a net social benefit of $175. (Mining
value of $200 less reclamation cost of $125 plus farming value of
$100 equals $175.) Not only would a strip mining prohibition lead to
lower social benefits than mining without regulation, but it would
also make the even more beneficial option of mining with reclamation unavailable.
The hypothetical is complicated if one assumes that the land can
be mined by some means other than stripping, but the analysis remains the same. In addition to the assumptions made in the preceding
paragraph (mining value of $200, farming value of $100, reclamation
cost of $125, and external costs of $50), assume that the mineral can
be removed by a less efficient technology at a net value of $100.
Under a law prohibiting strip mining, the land could be mined at a
gain of $100 and farmed at a gain of $100 yielding a net social benefit of $200. No alternative allocation would yield a higher social benefit. (The next best alternative would be to strip mine, reclaim and
farm which would net $175 as explained in the preceding paragraph.)
It would appear that in this case the prohibition on strip mining leads
to the most efficient resource allocation. The difficulty is that, although in this case the result is efficient, in other cases it will not be
efficient.
In the preceding hypothetical example, if the value of the mineral
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when mined by a technique other than strip mining is $50 instead of
$200, the net benefit under a law prohibiting strip mining would be
$150 (mining value of $50 plus farming value of $100). In the absence
of such a law, the optimum net value would be $175 (strip mining
value of $200 less reclamation cost of $125 plus farming value of
$100). In that case, the prohibition on strip mining would lead to a
less efficient resource allocation. At a minimum the conclusion which
should be drawn from the two examples is that strip mining should
only be prohibited in some cases. Those cases being when the difference between the value of the land, if strip mined, and the next highest value of the land when mined by other means is less than the cost
of reclamation and the value of the external costs resulting from strip
mining.8
An additional factor which argues against a total prohibition on
strip mining is that in some of those cases where the prohibition appears to lead to a more efficient allocation, the same allocation would
result without the prohibition on strip mining. In the example above
in which the mineral value was $200 if strip mined and $100 if mined
by the next most efficient technology, unregulated private allocation
would lead to the same result as the law prohibiting strip mining. If
strip mined, the land would net a maximum of $175 (mining value
$200 less reclamation cost of $125 plus farming value of $200). If
mined by the next best alternative technology, the land would net
$200 (mining value of $100 plus farming value of $100). Assuming
total information and zero transaction costs, 8 1 the parties would
choose not to strip mine with or without the law prohibiting it, and
society should not have to bear the costs of a law of prohibition.
The sole remaining justification for a prohibition on strip mining
is to eliminate or minimize external costs. In the above example, external costs were assumed to be $50, a net social loss which, because
80. Using the hypothetical example from the text, it would be efficient to prohibit strip
mining only if the cost of reclamation or the external costs exceed $150, the difference in
value of the mineral if strip mined and if mined by the next best method. A prohibition of
strip mining under these facts would prevent the miner from stripping and reclaiming, an
option he would follow in the absence of regulation and which would eliminate most of the
external costs. If the value of the mineral when mined by the next best method to strip
mining were $100, the prohibition of strip mining would be efficient, but unnecessary, since
the miner would choose not to strip mine anyway. Thus, the only case where a prohibition
would improve efficiency is where the miner would not voluntarily reclaim but the external
costs exceed the additional value realized by strip mining.
81. If transaction costs are zero those affected by external costs totaling $50 would pay
up to that amount to prevent the land from being strip mined. This, combined with part of
what the farmer would be willing to pay to preserve the lands farm value (up to $100)
would be sufficient to pay the miner to mine by some means other than stripping, despite
the higher value of the minerals when strip mined.
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of high transaction costs, would not be accounted for in the private
market place. In those particular cases, then, when the value of the
external costs of strip mining exceed the difference between the
value of the land when strip mined and the value of the land when
mined by the next most efficient technology, a prohibition on strip
mining would lead to the most efficient allocation-an allocation
8 2
which would not be achieved through purely private transactions.
The difficult problem is to determine which cases fall into the category for which a strip mining prohibition is justified.8 3 Because the
purpose of a blanket prohibition is to forbid all strip mining, it necessarily produces the inefficient as well as the efficient consequences.
A third regulatory alternative for the elimination of the external
diseconomies of surface mining is a permit system under which miners
pay a fee in return for which they acquire the right to strip mine.8 4
For such a system to achieve its desired goal of internalizing the costs
of strip mining, the fee should be equal to the external costs of strip
mining or to the cost of reclamation, whichever is less. The fee should
be waived if the miner chooses to reclaim the land.
Consider the following hypothetical example: The external costs
of strip mining a particular parcel total $50 and the cost of reclamation is $125. Under the suggested rule, the appropriate fee for a permit to strip mine would be $150.5 This amount would be distributed
to those suffering the external costs. (Implicit in this hypothetical is
an assumption that those suffering the effects of strip mining have a
86
legal right not to be so affected.)
For the fee to be set higher than the value of the externalities
would lead to inefficient allocation. Assume, for example, that the
fee were set at the cost of reclamation and the government used the
82. This conclusion assumes that the cost of the government regulatory system is less
than the value of the external costs avoided by the regulation.
83. Identifying the cases for which a particular regulation is appropriate is the central
problem of any government intervention in private resource allocation. It ultimately turns
on the government's information collection capacity. The information problem is discussed
supra note 50.
84. Most state regulations involve a permit, often in combination with bonding and reclamation requirements. For a discussion of state permit systems in general, see Binder, supra
note 1, at 351. For a survey of state legislation see SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY,
supra note 2.
85. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that government transactions are costless. Obviously the fee would have to reflect the costs of the operation of the permit system, and
would therefore have to be higher than the amount necessary to accomplish compensation
of those injured or reclamation of the land.
86. The analysis would be unchanged should the assumption be that the miner has a
right to pollute. The hypothetical case is formulated with the opposite assumption since it
is the assumption which underlies most regulatory approaches now in use.
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revenue to reclaim the land. The result would be identical in allocational terms to that under a mandatory reclamation system. In those
cases where the cost of reclamation was less than the sum of the external costs plus the value of the best use of the land in its reclaimed
condition, 7 reclamation would be efficient. But, if the cost of reclamation exceeds the value of the land reclaimed plus the value of the
external costs, reclamation would be inefficient. In the example under
consideration, if the value of the reclaimed land is less than $75, the
allocational effect of government reclamation would be inefficient.
The more efficient alternative would be to compensate those suffering external costs and to have the land unreclaimed, which is why the
suggested rule would set the fee at the lower of the two relevant variables: value of externalities and cost of reclamation.8 8
The rule would also allow the miner to choose to reclaim the land
and thus avoid payment of the fee. The need for this option is illustrated by the example just discussed. The external costs total $50 and
the cost of reclamation is $125. Also assume that the value of the
mineral is $200 and the value of the land for farming is $100 and the
miner owns both estates. With an option to either pay the $50 fee or
reclaim the land at a cost of $125, the miner would choose to do the
latter. By paying the fee and mining the net benefit to the miner
would be $150 ($200-$50). After mining and reclaiming the surface
would have a farming value of $100 and the net benefit to the miner
would be $175 ($200 for mining less $125 for reclamation plus $100
for farming). The result would not be different, assuming zero transaction costs, if the surface and mineral estates were severed because
the surface owner would be willing to pay the miner some value less
than $100 to reclaim and the miner would be willing to put something less than $50 for the same purpose. Thus a fee system without
the option to voluntarily reclaim would be inefficient in those cases
where the value of the external costs plus the value of the surface reclaimed is greater than the cost of reclamation. 9
An additional problem is raised by the fact that reclamation can be
done in various degrees. In some cases it might be possible to reclaim
the land to its original condition. In others it may even be possible to
improve the condition of the land. However, in most cases the opti87. As before, it is assumed that the surface has zero value unless reclaimed.
88. This analysis assumes that reclamation will eliminate all external costs. When that is
not the case, the rule would be adjusted to set the fee at the lower of the value of the externalities or the cost fo reclamation plus external costs not eliminated by reclamation.
89. Another reason for allowing an option to reclaim is that even when the cost of reclamation by the government is less than the value of the externalities, it may be less costly for
the miner to reclaim than for the government to do it.
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mum degree of reclamation will depend upon numerous factors relating to the condition of the land, the type of mining being done, and
the prospective use of the reclaimed land. A possible means of coping
with this problem would be the creation of reclamation standards.
On the surface it may appear that the imposition of reclamation
standards is a good means of optimizing reclamation expenditures.
The difficulty with this alternative, however, is identical to that discussed above in the context of water pollution.9" Once the standards
are set, they will quickly become non-optimum as the relative positions of the various variables change. Values of different land uses
will shift. Available reclamation technology will change as will available mining technology. The successful implementation of a system
of standards as a means of optimizing reclamation efforts would require such extensive information and such constant revision that it
can probably be ruled out as a reasonable regulatory option.
Finally, it would be possible to achieve reclamation through taxpayer support of government performed reclamation. Two points
should be made about this alternative. First, it would not alleviate the
problems of determining the appropriateness of reclamation or the
optimum degree. The possibility of reclaiming land which should not
be reclaimed would remain. Second, taxpayer support of reclamation
is an implicit recognition that the taxpayers as a group have no right
to be free from the external costs of mining and that they must, in
effect, buy their freedom from those externalities.
VII. CONCLUSION

The law of mineral severance has a long and relatively consistent
history. It has facilitated the severance of mineral and surface estates,
generally according to the rule that the mineral estate is dominant, in
a way which has promoted the efficient utilization of both surface
and subsurface resources. This efficiency has been achieved largely
through the judicial interpretation of instruments of conveyance according to the expressed or assumed intentions of the parties to the
conveyance. This restrained exercise of the judicial function has led
not only to socially desirable resource development, but also to the
fair treatment of individual owners of property rights.
As legislatures and activist judges begin to wrestle with the problems of third party impacts of surface mining, it is essential that the
policies they implement be based upon an understanding of the system of severed, private right which controls many of the minerals in
90. See discussion, note 50 supra.

January 1982]

IMPACT OF MINERAL SEVERANCE

237

this country and a recognition of the basically sound nature of that
system. The tools of regulation available to both the federal and state
governments should be finely adjusted for the problems they are intended to solve. The sledge hammer approaches of "prohibited this"
and "mandatory that" can only upset the basically well tuned system
of private rights. Those problems which do exist in the private system, problems to which the environmental movement has drawn
attention, will be better solved by sensitive adjustment than by starting over from scratch.

